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interstate commerce unless and until Congress changes its policy and
elects to exempt such regulation from the ban of the Sherman Act.
WmLIAm

E. SRmauN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER
AND RESTRAINT ON COMMERCE
Gustafson v. Ocala, 58 So.2d 658 (Fla.1951)
Complainant, a dairy c6partnership, sought a mandatory injunction
requiring the city of Ocala to inspect complainant's dairy facilities and
products and, if these passed inspection, to issue to complainant a
permit to sell its products within the city. An ordinance provided in
effect that inspection should be limited to the territorial boundaries of
Marion County, in which Ocala is located; and an amendment thereto
prohibited sale within the city of milk produced beyond the limits of
routine inspection. Ocala did not contend that the dairy and its
products would not pass inspection. Furthermore, the minutes of the
city council indicated that a desire to protect the local dairy industry
was the motivating factor in the enactment of the ordinance. Each
application of complainant was denied on the theory that its pasteurization plant was not located within the prescribed area of inspection. Ocala defended the ordinance as a valid exercise of police
power. On appeal, umpa), the ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory and a violation of the equal protection clauses of the Florida and
United States Constitutions.The position of the Florida Court is in keeping with its previous
decisions invalidating similar ordinances favoring residents over nonresidents, or home products over foreign products. 2 A statute that
deliberately and unreasonably gives an advantage to a particular
group and discriminates against others cannot be upheld as a valid

1

FLA. CoNsr. Decl. of Rights §1; U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.
0'Connell v. Kontojohn, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938); Whiddon v.
Vickers, 127 Fla. 222, 172 So. 923 (1937); McCreary v. State, 122 Fla. 494,
165 So. 657 (1936); Hamilton v. Collins, 114 Fla. 276, 154 So. 201 (1934);
Ex parte Smith, 100 Fla. 1, 128 So. 864 (1930).
2
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exercise of the police power. 3 Any classification made under the
police power is necessarily discriminatory in nature, but any valid
classification must be reasonable and must be made for the good of
the entire population. 4 Even on a health basis, absolute prohibition
of certain individuals from engaging in trade left open to others cannot
be justified, especially when the objective can be attained without
disrupting the free flow of commodities. Mere difference in place of
production or of residence cannot stand as a reasonable classification. 5
In practical effect, the Ocala ordinance made pasteurization within
Marion County a condition precedent for obtaining a permit to sell the
products within the city. The Florida Court has held that a statutory
condition precedent to engaging in business, when it results in practically absolute prohibition of some from engaging in such business
because of impossibility of compliance, is an unconstitutional infringement of a citizen's inherent right of property in the sense of freedom
to earn a livelihood in a customary manner. 6 Pasteurization is not
merely an incident in the production of milk but a major and necessary
step. It has nowhere been contended that an intrastate dairy servicing
a large portion of the state can be forced to maintain a pasteurization
plant in each county in which it sells milk. If the dairy operates on a
statewide basis in Florida, a demand for 67 pasteurization plants is
excessive. Some states have taken a stricter approach to the problem
than Florida by removing to a great extent the control exercised by
counties and municipalities over the production of milk. 7
Although the later cases throughout the jurisdictions have uniformly
struck down restrictive ordinances of this type, 8 the United States
3

See Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla.
1949), Legis., 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 408 (1949).
4
State ex rel. Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938).
5
State ex tel. James v. Gerrell, 137 Fla. 324, 188 So. 812 (1938); cf. from
the standpoint of interstate commerce Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935).
6
Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48 (1933).
7
Meridian v. Sippy, 54 Cal. App.2d 214, 128 P.2d 884 (1942); Dean Milk
Co. v. Elgin, 405 Ill. 204, 90 N.E.2d 112 (1950); Dean Milk Co. v. Aurora,
404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949); Dean Milk Co. v. Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597,
87 N.E.2d 751 (1949).
SLa Franchi v. Santa Rosa, 8 Cal.2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301 (1937); Van Gammersen v. Fresno, 51 Cal. App.2d 235, 124 P.2d 621 (1942); Moultrie Milk
Shed, Inc. v. Cairo, 206 Ga. 348, 57 S.E.2d 199 (1950); Grant v. Leavel, 259
Ky. 267, 82 S.W.2d 283 (1935); State ex rel. Larson v. Minneapolis, 190 Minn.
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Supreme Court has not been called upon to settle the validity of such
ordinances with respect to intrastate commerce under the United
States Constitution. On two notable occasions, Dyer v. City of Beloit9
and Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,10 the opportunity but not the
necessity was present. In the Dyer case the Supreme Court left
standing a decision of the Wisconsin court1 1 when the city confessed
error on appeal and amended the ordinance, thus making the question
moot. In the Dean case the Court found it necessary to determine
only the issue raised under the commerce clause, that is, that the
ordinance imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce. In
striking down the ordinancethe Court assumed that, since Congress
had not spoken to the contrary, the subject matter of the ordinance
lay within the sphere of state regulation even though interstate commerce might be affected incidentally. But in erecting an economic
barrier -protecting a major local industry against competition from
without the state, the city plainly discriminated against interstate
commerce; and this it could not do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to conserve the
legitimate local health interest were available. The Court found such
an ordinance unnecessary for protection, inasmuch as reasonable
alternatives existed.
A federal district court, in Miller v. Williams,12 has soundly observed that milk and cream are not only necessary articles of food but
also subjects of commerce, and that accordingly they may not be
excluded from the ordinary currents of trade and commerce, interstate
or intrastate, otherwise than by reasonable regulation designed to
protect the health of the community. The door is perhaps open for
Congressional regulation of both interstate and intrastate milk production when the two are co-existent in a locality and local regulation
188, 251 N.W. 121 (1933); Sheffield Farms Co. v. Seeman, 114 N.J.L. 455,
177 Atl. 872 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Abilene v. Tennessee Dairies, 225 S.W.2d 429
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Presscott v. City of Borger, 158 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
938 U.S. 825 (1948).
10340 U.S. 349 (1951), reversing 257 Wis. 308, 43 N.W.2d 480 (1950).
The Florida circuit court in the instant case relied heavily on this decision of
the Wisconsin court, which was in the process of appeal at the time.

11250 Wis. 613, 27 N.W.2d 733 (1947).
1212 F. Supp. 286 (D. Md. 1935).
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